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EAST EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW

Focus: Hate Speech Jurisprudence
in the United States and Hungary
Hate Speech and the U.S. Constitution
Geoffrey R. Stone

One of the most difficult issues in working out a system of free expression arises out of the need to reconcile a society's often competing commitments to freedom of speech and individual dignity.This conflict is
posed most poignantly in the context of libel, group
defamation and hate speech. To what extent must a
society, to be true to its commitment to free expression, tolerate speech that deliberately insults and
degrades a group or individual on the basis of race,
religion, gender or ethnic origin? On what theory
does the right to free expression embrace the right to
engage in individual or group defamation? On the
other hand, to what extent may a society, in furtherance of its commitment to individual dignity, censor
unpleasant racist or sexist or homophobic speech
merely because it offends, or even deeply offends,
particular groups or individuals? Can this possibly be
a principled basis on which to censor ideas and opinions in a society committed to open public debate?
For the past fifty years, the United States Supreme
Court has wrestled with these questions. While at
first the Supreme Court hinted at the possibility that
some regulation of group defamation and hate
speech would be constitutional, the Court has now
quite firmly concluded that such regulation would
most likely be unconstitutional.
The history of libel, group defamation and
hate speech regulation in American constitutional law begins with the Supreme Court's 1942
decision in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,315 U.S.
568 (1942), in which the Court announced that
some categories of speech are of only "low" First
Amendment value and are thus accorded less
than full constitutional protection:
"There are certain well-defined and narrowly
limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise

any Constitutional problem. These include the
lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the
insulting or "fighting" words.... It has been well
observed that such utterances are no essential part
of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight
social value as a step to truth that any benefit that
may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by
the social interest in order and morality."
The significance of this passage is that whereas
the Supreme Court views laws restricting most
forms of expression-for example, a law prohibition
the advocacy of communism-as presumptively
unconstitutional and sustainable only on a showing
that the restriction is necessary to prevent a clear and
present danger of some very serious evil (a standard
the Government almost never can meet), the Court
views laws restricting "low" value speech as presumptively constitutional and will sustain such
restrictions on a showing of mere "reasonableness."
Less than a decade after Chaplinsky,the Court confronted the issue of group defamation in Beauharnaisv.
Illinois,343 U.S. 250 (1952). Beauharnais, the president
of the White Circle League, organized the distribution
of a leaflet calling on the city council of Chicago "to halt
the further encroachment, harassment and invasion of
white people, their property, neighborhoods and persons, by the Negro." The leaflet called upon the "white
people in Chicago to unite," and added that "Ifpersuasion and the need to prevent the white race from
becoming mongrelized by the Negro will not unite us,
then the aggressions [rapes], robberies, knives, guns
and marijuana of the Negro surely will."
As a result of his participation in the distribution of this leaflet, Beauharnais was convicted
under an Illinois statute declaring it unlawful for
any person to distribute any publication which
"portrays depravity, criminality, unchastity or lack
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of virtue of a class of citizens, of any race, color,
creed or religion" or subjects them "to contempt,
derision, or obloquy."
In a five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court
upheld the conviction. Relying on Chaplinsky, the
Court explained that, because "libelous utterances
[are not] within the area of constitutionally protected speech," it was irrelevant that Beauharnais'
speech did not create a clear and present danger of
any serious harm. It was enough, the Court said,
that this was not a "purposeless restriction unrelated
to the peace and well-being of the State." Pointing
to the history of racial conflict in Illinois, the Court
observed that "we would deny experience to say
that the Illinois legislature was without reason in
seeking ways to curb false or malicious defamation
of racial and religious groups." In response to
Beauharnais' argument that he should at least have
been permitted the defense of truth, the Court concluded that the State could constitutionally prohibit
group defamation without regard to the truth or falsity of the statements if the defendant did not act
"with good motives and forjustifiable ends."
Although Beauharnaisseemed a landmark decision that would significantly affect the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the First Amendment for
years to come, in fact it has never been cited approvingly by the Supreme Court and, for all practical
purposes, has been defacto overruled. The beginning
of the end for Beauharnais was New York Times v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Sullivan, an elected
official in the city of Montgomery, Alabama,
brought a civil libel action against the New York
Times alleging that the Times had published several
statements that inaccurately described his involvement in suppressing a demonstration by black students who were protesting racial segregation. Upon
finding the statements to be false, thejury returned
a verdict for Sullivan in the amount of $500,000.
The Supreme Court reversed. At the outset, the
Court confronted its own past statements in
Chaplinsky and Beauharnaisto the effect that libelous
utterances are not "within the area of constitutionally protected speech." In rejecting these earlier
statements, the Court declared that "libel can claim

no talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations" and "must be measured by standards that satisfy the First Amendment."
Turning to the task of articulating these standards, the Court observed in an oft-quoted passage
that "we consider this case against the background
of a profound national commitment to the principle
that debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open." The essential difficulty, the
Court explained, is that "erroneous statement is
inevitable in free debate," and even false statements
must therefore be "protected if the freedoms of
expression are to have the 'breathing space' that
they 'need to survive.'" Thus, the Alabama law of
libel could not be "saved by its allowance of the
defense of truth," for a rule compelling the critic of
official conduct to guarantee the truth of all his factual assertions" would lead to intolerable "self-censorship." Indeed, under such a rule, "would-be critics of official conduct may be deterred from voicing
their criticism, even though it is believed to be true
and even though it is in fact true, because of doubt
whether it can be proved in court." Such a rule, the
Court concluded, "dampens the vigor and limits the
variety of public debate."
With these considerations in mind, the Court
held that public officials may not recover damages for
defamatory falsehood relating to their official conduct
unless they can prove "that the statement was made..
.with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."
New York Times revolutionized the law of libel
and, at the same time, undermined the principles
underlying Beauharnais.The decision in Beauharnais
had been based on the premise that defamatory
utterances are "unprotected" by the First
Amendment, whether or not they are false. New
York Times emphatically and unequivocally rejected
that premise. As a result, in the thirty years since
New York Times, it has come to be accepted in
American constitutional law that the Illinois statute
upheld in Beauharnaiswould no longer be held constitutional, and that such actions for group defamation are incompatible with the First Amendment
because they suppress ideas, opinions and assertions
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that may offend; but these do not create a clear and
present danger of serious harm.
The extent to which Beauharnaishas been discredited was made clear in the 1977 Skokie controversy. In 1977, Skokie, a northern Chicago suburb,
had a population of about 70,000 persons, 40,000 of
whom were Jewish. Approximately 5,000 of the
Jewish residents were survivors of Nazi concentration camps during World War II. Frank Collin,
leader of the National Socialist Party of America,
informed Skokie officials that the party intended to
hold a march through Skokie. Collin explained that
the demonstration would consist of thirty to fifty
individuals marching in single file wearing uniforms reminiscent of those worn by the Nazi Party
in Germany under Hitler and that they would wear
swastika armbands. The marchers would also carry
banners containing a swastika and signs bearing
such messages as "Free Speech for Whites."
Skokie officials filed suit seeking to enjoin the
marchers from wearing their uniforms, displaying
the swastika, or distributing any materials that
would "incite or promote hatred against persons of
Jewish faith or ancestry." The complaint alleged
that the march, as planned, was a "deliberate and
willful attempt to exacerbate the sensitivities of the
Jewish population in Skokie and to incite racial and
religious hatred" and that the display of the swastika in Skokie "constitutes a symbolic assault against
large numbers of the residents of Skokie and an incitation to violence and retaliation."
The Illinois Supreme Court held that the proposed
demonstration was protected expression and that an
injunction against the march would violate the First
Amendment. The Supreme Court of the United States
declined even to review the issue. (Eventually, Colin
agreed to move the demonstration from Skokie to
downtown Chicago. In 1978, he held an'hour-long rally
at which 400 riot-helmeted policemen protected the
twenty-five Nazi demonstrators from several thousand
counter-protesters. There were seventy-two arrests and

some rock and bottle throwing but no serious violence.)
The Supreme Court returned to the hate speech
issue fifteen years later in RAV v. City ofSt Pau, 112
S.Ct. 2538 (1992). After burning a cross on a black

family's lawn, the petitioner, a teenager, was
charged under the St. Paul, Minnesota, BiasMotivated Crime Ordinance, which prohibited the
display of a burning cross, a swastika, or other symbol which one knows or has reason to know "arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others" on the basis
of race, color, creed, religion or gender. The
Minnesota Supreme Court interpreted the ordinance as prohibiting only constitutionally unprotected "fighting words."
In Chaplinsky, the Court had listed "fighting
words" among the "well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any
Constitutional problem." Indeed, in Chaplinsky
itself the Court had upheld the conviction of an
individual for calling a police officer a "damned
racketeer" and a "damned Fascist." The Court
explained that "fighting words" - personal epithets
hurled face-to-to face at another individual which
are likely to cause the average addressee to fight are "unprotected" by the First Amendment because
they "are of such slight social value as a step to truth
that any benefit that may be derived from them is
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order
and morality."
In the half-century between Chaplinsky and
R.A.V, the Court had consistently narrowed the
scope of the fighting words doctrine and, indeed,
had not upheld a single fighting words conviction.
Nonetheless, the Court never directly called into
question the continued vitality of the doctrine itself.
Thus, given that the state courts in R.A.V already
had interpreted the ordinance as limited to fighting
words, there would not seem to be any serious question about the constitutionality of the ordinance.
(Note: The question whether the burning of the
cross actually constituted "fighting words" was not
considered by the Court because the defendant had
not yet been tried.)
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court invalidated
the St. Paul ordinance, holding that the ordinance
was invalid even if it was limited only to fighting
words. This was so, the Court explained, because
the ordinance was selective among fighting words
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-it prohibited only some fighting words (those
related to race, for example), but not all fighting
words (those related to political affiliation). The
Court began by noting that the "First Amendment
generally prevents government from proscribing
speech because of disapproval of the ideas
expressed." Regulations of speech because of its
content "are presumptively invalid." And this is
true, the Court reasoned, even within a category of
otherwise unprotected expression. Thus, although
"the government may proscribe libel, it may not
make the further content discrimination of proscribing only libel critical of the government." In
R.A.V., the ordinance restricted only those fighting
words that "insult, or provoke violence 'on the basis
of race, color, creed, religion or gender."' This, the
Court concluded, is impernissible:
"Displays containing abusive invective, no matter how vicious or severe, are permissible unless
they are addressed to one of the specific disfavored
topics. Those who wish to use "fighting words" in
connection with other ideas-to express hostility, for
example, on the basis of political affiliation, union
membership, or homosexuality-are not covered.
The First Amendment does not permit St. Paul to
impose special prohibitions on those speakers who
express views on disfavored subjects."
Finally, the Court rejected the claim that the
"discrimination" in the ordinance was justified
because it was necessary to further the city's compelling interest in helping "to ensure the basic
human rights of members of groups that have historically been subjected to discrimination." The
Court explained that the content limitation was not
"necessary" to achieve the city's interest because the
city could have achieved its ends without the content limitation by banning all fighting words. Thus,
"the only interest distinctively served by the content
limitation is that of displaying the city council's special hostility towards the particular biases singled
out. That is precisely what the First Amendment
forbids."
The distance traversed from Beauharnais to
R.A.V is considerable indeed. After RAY, it would
seem that no direct regulation of speech, even of

otherwise unprotected speech, that is drawn explicitly to protect particular groups against offensive or
hurtful expression will pass constitutional muster.
And this is so because, as the Court has often said,
apart from the existence of certain categories of
"low" value expression, there is an "equality of status in the field of ideas" and, "above all else, the First
Amendment means that government has no power
to restrict expression because of its message, its
ideas, its subject matter, or its content." Police
Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
In Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S.Ct.-(1993), the
Court's most recent foray into this area, the Court
upheld a Wisconsin hate-crime penalty enhancement statute. In 1989, a group of black men, including Mitchell, were discussing a scene from the
motion picture "Mississippi Burning," in which a
white man beat a young black boy who was praying. At that point, a young white boy walked by and
Mitchell said, "There goes a white boy; go get him."
The group then ran towards the boy and beat him
severely. Mitchell was convicted of aggravated battery, an offense which ordinarily carries a maximum sentence of two years' imprisonment. But
because thejury found that Mitchell had intentionally selected his victim because of the boy's race, the
maximum penalty for Mitchell's offense was
increased to seven years under a state statute providing for penalty enhancement whenever the
defendant "intentionally selects the person against
whom the crime is committed because of the race,
religion, color, disability, sexual orientation, national origin or ancestry of that person."
The Court unanimously rejected the argument
that this statute violated the First Amendment
because it "enhances the maximum penalty for conduct motivated by a discriminatory point of view
more severely than the same conduct engaged in for
some other reason." The Court explained that "a
physical assault is not by any stretch of the imagination expressive conduct protected by the First
Amendment." Thus, this case is different from
R.AY because "the ordinance struck down in
R.A.V. was explicitly directed at expression,"
whereas "the statute in this case is aimed at conduct
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unprotected by the First Amendment." Moreover,
although reaffirming that a state may not punish
an individual more severely because he has unpopular or even odious beliefs, the Court nonetheless
concluded that this statute involved enhanced punishment for motive, which is commonplace in the
law, rather than for abstract belief.
The current state of the law, then, would
seem to permit penalty enhancement for nonspeech crimes when the defendant acts for impermissible, hate-based motives, but to prohibit punishment for speech (including symbolic speech,
like wearing a swastika or burning a cross)
because it offends or otherwise harms particular
groups or individuals on the basis of such factors
as race, religion, gender or ethnicity.
The Court has thus subsumed hate-speech
and group defamation legislation within its more
general assumption that most forms of contentbased restrictions of speech are presumptively
unconstitutional. The underlying rationale of
this approach is that government cannot be trusted to makejudgments about which ideas can and
cannot legitimately be aired in public debate.

Moreover, to guard against the risk that government might effectuate its preferences for some
ideas over others merely by claiming that it is
restricting speech because it is harmful, the
Court has held that government may not regulate expression because of its content except in
the most extraordinary of circumstances.
Thus, just as the government cannot constitutionally restrict advocacy of communism, agitation against an on-going war, burning of the
American flag, or the expression of ideas that
deeply offend others, so too is it foreclosed from
restricting speech that insults or degrades particular racial, religious, ethnic or gender groups.
The point is not that such expression is harmless.
It is, rather, that there are better ways to address
the harm than by giving government the power
to decide which ideas and opinions the citizens of
a free and self-governing nation may and may not
express.

Geoffrey R. Stone is Harry Kalven,Jr.Professor of Law
and Provost at the University of Chicago

Hate Speech for Hostile Hungarians
Andras Sajo
Dean Stone reviews the past fifty years of the U.S.
Supreme Court's struggle to work out a system of
free expression that reconciles "a society's often
competing commitments to freedom of speech and
individual dignity." The emerging democracies of
Eastern Europe have had only three or four years to
devise their own solutions to this same problem.
Legal rules chosen in haste, however, may have a
lasting social impact. This article reviews the hate
speech/free speech debate in postcommunist
Hungary, in the light of U.S. standards (which, as it
happens, played a major role in the Hungarian

Court's deliberations).
Unrestrained speech, on the one hand, given
the social and political conflicts racking Hungarian
society during the transition period, may endanger
social stability. Restricted speech, on the other
hand, may immobilize nascent civil society, limit
fundamental freedoms, and stifle the lively criticism of government so essential to democracy. The
present-day legal system in Hungary seems to be
torn between these two irreconcilable positions.
The constitution as amended in 1989 guarantees
freedom of thought and religion and the right of
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